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Abstract—Aerospace systems that fail in service are often 
repaired or refurbished and returned to service. 1 2 3 
Repair/refurbishment may return the system to the 
equivalent of new condition, to some state less than new 
condition, or perhaps even to a better than new condition. 
Respectively, repair/refurbishment may have no effect on 
future reliability, degrade future reliability, or improve it. 
Depending on which reliability state the post-failure 
repair/refurbishment produces for the system, preventative 
maintenance schemes can differ dramatically. For example, 
should the repair/refurbishment return the system to a less 
than new condition with each subsequent failure, shorter 
preventative maintenance intervals as a function of number 
of the maintenance cycles increase overall availability and 
cost effectiveness. Should the repair/refurbishment return 
the system to a better than new condition, longer 
preventative maintenance intervals as a function of number 
of maintenance cycles increase overall availability and cost 
effectiveness. 
 
The US Navy has provided a set of failure and survivor data 
for the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, General Electric F414 low 
bypass gas turbine engine removals due to foreign object 
damage. Such removals regularly repair/refurbish the 
engines and return them to service, often multiple times. No 
investigations into the reliability state post 
repair/refurbishment have been done, yet such knowledge 
could be factored into developing more effective 
preventative and corrective maintenance plans. 
 
This report presents a method to determine whether 
repair/refurbishment cycles improve or reduce useful life 
post repair/refurbishment. This method employs a covariate 
Weibull model, where the scale and shape parameters are 
exponential functions of the covariate observed numbers of 
repair/refurbishment cycles. A conditional inferential 
approach is formulated using this model employing 
objective prior models to avoid any unnecessary 
assumptions. This model and method are then validated 
using simulated data to demonstrate that these phenomena 
may be reliably observed. The F/A-18 engine data are then 
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processed to determine the state post repair/refurbishment, 
which may be used to enhance maintenance planning.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In earlier papers Millar, Mazzuchi and Sarkani [1] [2] report 
the results of a non-parametric statistical study of 
unscheduled engine removals data from records of 
operational service of the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, 
powered by a pair of General Electric F414 low bypass gas 
turbine engines. Engine removals are likely the most 
disruptive and costly maintenance action affecting naval 
aircraft, particularly if unscheduled on board an aircraft 
carrier in action at sea. The aircraft must be removed from 
flight operations to remove and replace the affected engine, 
the largest piece of equipment that can be swapped out this 
way. The affected engine is usually shipped to an 
intermediate maintenance base and a replacement spare 
engine is usually delivered to the ship. The engine is 
inspected and possibly tested at the intermediate 
maintenance base, and any modules requiring teardown for 
detail inspection and repair are replaced with spare 
modules. The modules to be serviced are forwarded to a 
maintenance depot to be rebuilt.  
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Good understanding of the likelihood of unscheduled 
engine removals as a result of periodic inspection or 
damage detected in service is needed to optimize 
maintenance planning, facilities and manning, logistics and 
spares and parts provisioning. The purpose of this and the 
earlier studies is to characterize the pattern of engine 
removals for various causes as a function of accumulated 
engine operating hours. This information enables 
maintenance and logistics planning for unscheduled engine 
removals based on the history of the specific engines in 
service at a given location. For example, the probability of 
having to remove an engine from a specific aircraft due for 
inspection, for a specific reason for removal, can be better 
forecast with the methods developed during this study, 
based on the accumulated operating hours of the specific 
engines involved. Planning preventive and corrective 
maintenance over a longer horizon can be based on a firmer 
forecast of removals and the likely causes. Personnel, tools 
and equipment, logistics and spares can be provisioned in 
advance to speed turnaround and minimize costly spares 
stocks.  
The earlier study yielded estimates for the hazard rate and 
survivor function through to overhaul for three classes of 
engine reasons for removal. The data used aggregated 
records from all F414 engines installed in F/A-18 aircraft 
over the first eight years of US Navy operational service. 
More detail on this study can be found in Millar [3]. 
One of the leading classes of reasons for removal was 
confirmed to be foreign object damage (FOD) to the engine 
fan or compressor, as detected through engine failure, pilot 
squawk or, most commonly, during periodic inspection at a 
more or less fixed interval. FOD alone caused about 20% of 
all unscheduled engine removals. The other two classes of 
reasons for removal combined multiple reasons for removal, 
had different statistical characteristics, and were considered 
to be qualitatively different in being more dependent on 
inherent engine component reliability and maintenance 
processes rather than exogenous influences.  
FOD may result from bird ingestion in flight or, more 
commonly; it is due to debris sucked into the engines during 
operation on the ground (including shipboard) or during 
takeoff and landing. The exposure of individual aircraft to 
these flight conditions and thus FOD hazard is variable 
depending on operational location and mission. Over a large 
population of aircraft performing similar missions in a 
variety of environments, given the lack of detailed 
information on the exposure and usage on individual 
aircraft, our basic expectation was that aggregate FOD 
hazard levels should not vary greatly over the engine 
lifetime, i.e. FOD incidents and resultant removals might be 
expected to follow an exponential distribution. However, 
the results of the earlier studies of this data did not 
unambiguously confirm this expectation, motivating this 
study to further elucidate the findings and provide more 
useful guidance to F/A-18 propulsion system sustainment. 
The data in this and previous studies included many engines 
that were removed, repaired, and returned to service. The 
number of removal/repair cycles associated with each datum 
is covariate with that datum, information that can be of 
significance in planning cost effective and mission effective 
preventative and corrective maintenance. The data in this 
and previous studies were also dominated by suspensions or 
survivors, engine removals for reasons such as for 
scheduled preventative maintenance when no damage was 
noted nor were repairs required. These survivor data had 
associated numbers of removal/repairs covariate data as 
well. To take advantage of the additional information 
provided by the number of repair/refurbishment cycle 
covariates associated with the failure and survivor data, the 
failure distribution model should reflect potential effects 
due to the covariate. In this report, a basic Weibull 
distribution model is modified to reflect changes in 
reliability as a function of the covariates. This covariate 
Weibull model expresses the scale and shape parameters as 
exponential functions of the covariate number of 
repair/refurbishment cycles, which allows each parameter to 
either increase or decrease as a function of 
repair/refurbishment cycles.  
With such a covariate Weibull model, the next step is to 
infer from the data (the failures and survivors with their 
concomitant covariate numbers of repair/refurbishment 
cycles) the reliability as a function of repair/refurbishment 
cycle. An extensive literature search failed to reveal any 
classical method that could be used to infer reliability from 
covariate failure and survivor data using such a covariate 
distribution model. To address this problem, the authors 
developed a novel conditional inferential approach that 
could infer reliability from covariate failure and survivor 
data using the covariate Weibull model. 
Before attempting to infer reliability for the F/A-18 engine 
using the covariate Weibull model and the conditional 
inferential approach developed by the authors, both the 
covariate Weibull model and conditional inferential 
approach were validated using simulated covariate failure 
and survivor data and the validation process and results are 
presented in this report. These simulated data reflected a 
complex relationship between reliability as a function of 
repair/refurbishment cycle, perhaps more complex than 
would be expected from a real world scenario. Obtaining 
successful validation results using this simulated data 
indicates a fairly robust validation of both the covariate 
Weibull model and conditional inferential approach. 
The data from the F/A-18 engines in this report consisted of 
238 failure data and 593 survivor data with associated 
repair/refurbishment cycle number covariate data. These 
data were processed using the covariate Weibull model and 
the conditional inferential approach developed for it, and 
some rather interesting and unexpected results were 
obtained in the inference for reliability as a function of 
repair/refurbishment cycle number. Not so unexpected was 
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that as repair/refurbishment cycle number increased, the 
failure mode trended from early wearout to infant mortality 
(see section 2). A surprise inference was that the critical life 
increased as repair/refurbishment cycle number increased. 
This report concludes with a hypothetical demonstration of 
how these inferences obtained using the covariate Weibull 
model via the conditional inferential method as described 
could be used in improving mission assurance via 
preventative maintenance scheduling taking advantage of 
these results. 
2. METHOD  
General Failure Model Selection 
Selection of a model for the uncertainty about the data is a 
task based on knowledge of the physics that produces the 
data, and the basic characteristics of the data. The data to be 
analyzed for reliability related problems consists of times of 
failure, and times at which the unit was observed to have 
not failed as yet, commonly called survivors or suspensions. 
These data are one-sided; they can only have positive semi-
definite values. Further, there is no reason to suspect that 
the physics involved in failure would produce a multi-modal 
time of failure model. Beyond these two facts, nothing more 
can be presumed about the distribution of failure times. 
Equation (1) provides the general Weibull density function, 
which has a location parameter t1 ≥ 0, a scale parameter 
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 (1) 
The Weibull model is a very general model for reliability 
related problems. One very useful feature of the Weibull 
model for reliability problems is that the parameters all have 
physical meanings. This is not the case for many probability 
distribution models. The location parameter t1 represents the 
time before which failures cannot occur, and is called the 
failure-free time. The scale parameter η is the time at which 
63.2% of all failures will have occurred, and is called the 
critical life. The shape parameter β is an indicator of failure 
mode. Values of β < 1 indicate an infant mortality failure 
mode. Values of β = 1 indicate a useful life failure mode. 
Values 1 < β < 4 indicate an early wearout failure mode. 
And, values of β > 4 indicate an old age failure mode. 
Depending on the values of these parameters, the Weibull 
model can represent just about any uni-modal, one-sided 
distribution shape for failures imaginable, with skews to 
either left or right. 
An important aside relative to this density formulation: 
Weibull’s original paper [4] published in September 1951 
provided a distribution function that would produce the 
density function in equation (2).  
 ( ) ( )111 1( | , , )
ft t
f fpd t t t t e
α




= −    (2) 
In discussions of Weibull’s paper [5] published in June 
1952, Weibull noted that his distribution function as 
originally published was incorrect by stating that the 
“…parentheses are an awkward misprint.” Correction of 
this misprint produces the density function in equation (1).  
The significance of this typographical error is profound. 
First, equation (2) cannot be reparameterized to produce 
equation (1) without comingling the parameters; the density 
function in equation (2) is fundamentally flawed since 
neither λ nor α can be classed as proper location, scale, or 
shape parameters. Second, textbooks [6] [7] exist that use 
the incorrect density function in equation (2) for the 
Weibull model. And, third, there are statistical software 
packages and tools [8] [9] that use the incorrect density 
function in equation (2) for the Weibull model. The caveat 
for the reader of this report is that whenever encountering 
any work using the Weibull model, and when considering 
any software package or tool, it is imperative to verify that 
the implementation of the Weibull model uses the proper 
form expressible as equation (1). The results obtained in any 
analytical work or through use of a software package that 
uses a form expressible as equation (2) subsequently may be 
pathological. 
For the work presented in this report, the location parameter 
t1 in equation (1) is set to zero. There exists no reason to 
believe that any engine could not fail the instant operation 
begins. 
Incorporating a Repair/Refurbishment Number Covariate 
If a repair/refurbishment is known to return a system to a 
new condition, then failure or survivor data obtained post 
repair/refurbishment should be modelled exactly as for new 
systems. Should there be uncertainty as to whether a 
repair/refurbishment will return the system to a new 
condition or some other condition, then the number of 
repair/refurbishments for any particular failure or survivor 
datum is covariate for that datum. The failure model should 
thus reflect the effect of the covariate upon the parameters 
of the model. 
For the Weibull model, this means that the covariate should 
be implemented such that it can change the base values for 
the parameters η and β as the covariate value changes, yet 
not reduce either parameter to an illegal value of zero or 
less. A suitable mathematical implementation to achieve this 
is to formulate η and β as exponential functions of the 
number of repair/refurbishments, Nr, introducing four new 
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Substitution of η (Nr) and β (Nr) from equations (3) for η 
and β respectively into equation (1) produces a failure 
model that can reflect the effects of repair/refurbishments. 
Note also in equations (3) that if the new parameters 
ηc = βc = 0, then this covariate model reduces to the original 
Weibull model in equation (1). Unlike η0 and β0, which 
have the same limits as η and β, ηc and βc can take any 
value (-∞,∞). 
Conditional Inferential Approach 
The first step to investigate whether the numbers of 
repair/refurbishments affect the reliability of an aerospace 
system is to infer from the data the uncertainty model for 
the parameters of the selected failure model, our covariate 
Weibull distribution model. With conditional inferential 
methods, the joint probability density model for the 
parameters of the covariate Weibull distribution is 
developed based solely on the data. With this joint density, 
it is possible to compute any probability calculation that 
might be useful. To develop the joint density of η0, β0, ηc, 
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In equation (4), the first term to the right of the proportion, 
pd(data|η0, β0, ηc, βc), is the likelihood. When the data is 
limited to only failure times, this is the same likelihood 
function used in calculating maximum likelihood estimates. 
The second term to the right of the proportion, 
pd(η0, β0, ηc, βc), is the joint prior density for η0, β0, ηc, 
and βc. The joint prior density is selected to model the 
knowledge or ignorance of η0, β0, ηc, and βc before 
obtaining the data. The proportionality in the equation is 
insignificant; the proportionality constant can always be 
calculated by integrating over all values of η0, β0, ηc, and 
βc. The term on the left, pd(η0, β0, ηc, βc |data), the joint 
density of η0, β0, ηc, and βc. given the data, is called the 
joint posterior density. 
Selection of the prior model for some problems can pose 
some difficulty. Some decision makers feel that using a 
priori knowledge of the parameters somehow prejudices the 
results, casting the pall of a rigged decision subject to 
second-guessing. Beyond that, for many uncertainty models 
that might be selected for the data for various problems, the 
parameters have no useful physical meaning, and thus no 
reason exists to have any a priori knowledge of them. To 
address both of these difficulties, it is possible to use a prior 
density model that imparts no a priori knowledge of the 
parameters. This is called using a noninformative or 
ignorance prior [11]. Use of ignorance priors establishes a 
basis of maximum objectivity for the decision, and 
alleviates the difficulty of dealing with any second-
guessing. The joint prior density model is generally 
structured such that the parameters are independent. Using 
the Weibull model, because η (Nr) and β (Nr) are scale and 
shape parameters respectively, Jeffrey’s priors [12] are very 
suitable as the ignorance priors for η0 and β0 and are 
presented in equations (5).  
 ( ) ( )0 0
0 0
1 1;pd pdη β
η β∝ ∝  (5) 
On the other hand, ηc, and βc are arbitrary constants in our 
covariate Weibull distribution model. A constant density 
uncertainty model reflects objectivity for such parameters, 
and the ignorance priors for ηc, and βc are given in equation 
(6). 
 ( ) ( )1 ; 1c cpd pdη β∝ ∝  (6) 
Now, given as data Nf failures and Ns survivors (times of 
good inspections or when some other unrelated failure 
occurred – e.g., a maintenance mechanic breaks off a stud in 
inspection), the posterior density model is formed in 
equation (7) using the covariate Weibull distribution from 
equation (4) with TSRfi being the time since 
repair/refurbishment of the ith failure datum with covariate 
number of repairs/refurbishments Nrfi, and TSRsj being the 
time since repair/refurbishment of the jth survivor datum 
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In equation (7), the first term to the right of the proportion 
in brackets ([⋅]) is the likelihood for the covariate failure 
data, the second term in brackets ([⋅]) is the likelihood for 
the covariate survivor data, and the two remaining terms are 
the Jeffrey’s priors for η0 and β0. The priors for ηc, and βc 
do not appear explicitly. One very nice feature of 
conditional inferential methods apparent in equation (7) is 
that survivor data can be used directly via the likelihood 
[13]. Observed times at which a subsystem in service has 
not failed comprise very important information that should 
not be neglected in the posterior or in the decision. For 
some problems, the number of survivor data may exceed 
that for failure data, and there may be only survivor data 
and no failure data at all. Conditional inferential methods 
provide solutions for these data sets [14]; solutions are not 
possible using classical methods without employing 
numerous assumptions that may be questionable and adding 
appreciable conservatism [14].  
Reliability Distribution Formulation 
The inference from the data of the uncertainty distribution 
for the reliability as a function of the number of 
repair/refurbishments, Nr, can play a significant role in 
developing a maintenance schedule that maximizes mission 
assurance or minimizes cost of maintenance. The 
uncertainty distribution pd(R(T |Nr)|data) can be developed 
by starting with the standard Weibull model. Equation (8) 
provides the formulation of reliability using this model. 







=  (8) 
For the covariate Weibull distribution model, reliability 
becomes a function of Nr by a simple substitution of 
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=  (9) 
For a given set of failure and survivor data, with their 
concomitant covariate numbers of repairs/refurbishments, 
equation (7) provides the joint uncertainty model for η0, β0, 
ηc, and βc given this data. The uncertainty model 
pd(R(T|Nr,η0,β0,ηc,βc)|data) is obtained by multiplying 
equation (9) by the posterior in equation (7). The full 
algebraic expansion of that product is quite busy, and as 
will be seen later, is unnecessary. The shorter form of this 
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This still does not yield the quantity of interest, the 
uncertainty distribution of reliability given the data as a 
function of repair/refurbishment number pd(R(T|Nr)|data). 
However, this distribution is obtainable by applying 
marginalization integrals for η0, β0, ηc, and βc. to equation 
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(11) 
Equation (11) also would be quite busy with full algebraic 
expansion, but such is unnecessary as will be seen later. By 
integrating the density model in equation (11), quantitative 
values of the assurance based on the data that the reliability 
exceeds some required level for the system given Nr. 
Another way to say this is that by integrating equation (11), 
one can calculate quantitatively how sure they can be based 
on the data that the reliability exceeds a required level given 
Nr. The compliment of this assurance is the risk that the 
reliability of the system, given the data for a specified 
number of repair/refurbishments, will not meet the required 
value. 
Numerical Methods 
The uncertainty distribution in equation (7) is not 
analytically integrable. As a result, neither is the integral in 
equation (10) analytically integrable, nor would equation 
(11) be. The solution is to use numerical methods, namely 
Monte Carlo methods [15]. Monte Carlo methods are used 
widely for accurately approximating the evaluation of 
probability integrals. Real world risk problems, such as the 
subject of this report, are quite often solvable only using 
Monte Carlo methods. 
The central issue to integrating equations (7) and (11), using 
Monte Carlo methods, is to obtain a large number of 
samples of η0, β0, ηc, and βc from the joint posterior 
uncertainty model in equation (7). There exist no statistical 
software packages with built-in samplers for the joint 
posterior density function of equation (7). The remedy is to 
use Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to 
sample this posterior. MCMC methods allow full range 
sampling of arbitrary distributions of any dimension given 
the formulation of the joint density [16]. With sufficient 
MCMC sampling of the joint posterior in equation (7), it is 
possible to compute very accurate approximations for 
almost any measure or statistic of interest, including 
integration of the uncertainty distribution of reliability given 
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the data as a function of repair/refurbishment number, 
pd(R(T|Nr)|data), in equation (11). 
Once the joint MCMC samples of η0, β0, ηc, and βc are 
obtained, samples from the uncertainty model in equation 
(11) then may be obtained using a non-intuitive yet simple 
process. Monte Carlo samples of R(T|Nr)|data are obtained 
by simply evaluating equation (9) at these joint MCMC 
samples of η0, β0, ηc, and βc. at the desired value of Nr. It is 
this simple process that obviates full algrebraic expansion of 
equations (10) and (11). 
Using the Monte Carlo samples of R(T|Nr)|data, it is very 
easy to calculate such quantities as the risk that the 
reliability at T = 2 does not exceed 90% after two 
repair/refurbishments given the data. Using M samples of 
R(T|Nr)|data (developed using the M joint samples of η0, β0, 
ηc, and βc), it is only necessary to count the number of 
samples of R(T=2|Nr = 2)|data < 0.9 and divide by M. 
Equation (12) shows how easily this risk may be calculated 
by evaluating equation (9) at the joint samples of η0, β0, ηc, 
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3. VALIDATION  
Before using the covariate Weibull model and conditional 
inferential approach presented in section 2 on the F/A-18 
engine covariate failure and survivor data, it is prudent to 
validate the approach by using artificial data generated 
using known values of η0, β0, ηc, and βc for various values 
of Nr. 1,000 failure and survivor data were developed for 
each covariate value of Nr = 0, 1, 2, and 3 (total of 4,000 
covariate data) by sampling the Weibull model that results 
when equations (3) are substituted into equation (1) using 
known values of η0, β0, ηc, and βc. Table 1 contains the 
values of η0, β0, ηc, and βc used for validation. 







For this validation process, the values in Table 1 will cause 
the critical life to reduce as the number of 
repairs/refurbishments increases, and the failure mode will 
shift from early wearout to infant mortality as well. Figure 
1 demonstrates how the true validation failure data 
distributions change as values of Nr change from 0 to 3. 
Figure 1 – True Validation Failure Distributions for 
Nr = 0 (red), 1 (orange), 2 (green), and 3 (blue) reflect 
hypothetical decreases in critical life with failure modes 
moving from early wearout more to infant mortality as Nr 
increases. 
The validation data were generated by the following 
process, assuming that preventative maintenance would 
occur at TSR = 400. With Nr = 0, 1,000 failure samples were 
generated from the Weibull distribution with parameter 
values for η and β developed from the parameter values for 
η0, β0, ηc, and βc from Table 1 using equations (3). Samples 
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that occurred before TSR = 400 were collected as failures 
with covariate Nr = 0, and those that occurred at or after 
TSR = 400 were collected as survivors at 400 with covariate 
Nr = 0. This step was repeated with covariate values ranging 
from Nr = 1 to Nr = 3. Table 2 shows the numbers of samples 
collected for each covariate value. 
Table 2:  Validation Failure and Survivor Sample 
Numbers by Covariate Value 
Nr 0 1 2 3 
Failures 794 798 773 792 
Survivors 206 202 227 208 
 
Figure 2 shows the empirical distributions of the samples of 
validation failures for each covariate value. 
Figure 2 – Distributions of validation failure sample 
data for Nr = 0 (red), 1 (orange), 2 (green), and 3 (blue) 
demonstrate how the sampled failure distributions 
changed with successive repair/refurbishments. 
In figure 2, the codes to produce these density curves uses a 
cosine bell function on the ends of the data ranges, which 
for Nr = 3 (green) and Nr = 4 (blue) created distortions of the 
true modes at TSR = 0 that caused them to return to zero 
instead of the true value of ∞. The fact that all failures 
beyond TSR = 400 were used as survivor data effectively 
truncates the failure data sampling possible from the 
distributions in figure 1. This truncation combined with the 
cosine bell function as applied by the codes produces the 
wavy artifacts out past TSR = 200. The distributions in 
figure 2 actually look more like real data distributions than 
those in figure 1, which should make these data suitable for 
a robust validation of the approach presented in section 2. 
Table 3 provides the statistics for the MCMC samples of the 
parameters generated by using the procedure outlined in 
section 2 with the validation data as described in Table 2 
and figure 2. 
Table 3:  Validation Model Parameter Sample Statistics 
with True Parameter Values in Parentheses below the 
Mean Values 
 Validation Sample Statistics 
Parameter Minimum Maximum Mean 
(True) 
σ 
η0 273.9 318.6 295.4 
(300) 
6.58 
β0 1.38 1.66 1.49 
(1.5) 
0.039
ηc -0.162 -0.040 -0.105 
(-0.1014)
0.017




In Table 3, the mean values of the samples of all of the 
parameters compared very favorably with the true values of 
the parameters listed in Table 1, and the standard deviations 
were all relatively small. The Markov chains were all very 
stable, and visual inspection of the joint parameter samples 
revealed that the sample ensembles appeared to be noise. 
These results validate that the approach presented in section 
2 will allow investigation of reliability for systems with 
failure and survivor data with multiple 
repair/refurbishments covariates. 
4. DATA 
The failure and survivor data with their concomitant 
covariate number of repair/refurbishments collected for the 
F/A-18 engines are summarized in Table 4 and Figure 3. 
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Table 4:  F/A-18 Engine Failure and Survivor Data 
Numbers for Covariate Values Nr = 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
Nr 0 1 2 3 4 Totals 
Failures 193 41 3 1 0 238 
Survivors 421 140 29 2 1 593 
 
Figure 3 – F/A-18 engine failure (red) and survivor 
(blue) data for Nr = 0, 2, 3, and 4. 
Per Table 4, there were a total of 238 failure data with 
covariates, and a total of 593 survivor data with covariates. 
The covariate numbers ranged up to Nr = 4; however, with 
Nr = 4, there was only one survivor and no failures. The 
numbers of data dropped off rather quickly as the covariate 
number increased. Figure 3 shows clearly that these data are 
dominated by survivor data, and the distribution of failures 
appeared to change dramatically between covariate values 
of Nr = 0 and Nr = 1. To protect proprietary corporate data, 
the times of failures and survivors in figure 3 were 
multiplied by an arbitrary constant yielding arbitrary Time 
Since Removal (TSR) units. These arbitrary TSR units are 
used throughout this report when discussing results obtained 
from the data. 
5. RESULTS 
The procedure described in section 2 was applied to the 
F/A-18 engine data described in section 4 to obtain 10,000 
joint samples of η0, β0, ηc, and βc. These joint samples of 
the covariate Weibull model will be discussed initially, with 
a few insights gained directly therefrom. Second, results 
such as reliability that can be derived from these joint 
samples will be discussed. Third, these results will be used 
in a demonstration of how a preventative maintenance 
schedule can be developed to improve mission assurance. 
MCMC Sampling Based on the Data 
The F/A-18 engine failure and survivor data with covariate 
data were processed with the procedure described in section 
2, and 10,000 joint samples of η0, β0, ηc, and βc were 
obtained. Table 5 provides the marginal parameter sample 
statistics that were obtained for η0, β0, ηc, and βc. 
Table 5:  F/A-18 Engine Covariate Weibull Model 
Parameter Sample Statistics 
 Parameter Sample Statistics 
Parameter Minimum Maximum Mean σ 
η0 4.77 7.47 6.06 0.407 
β0 1.09 1.56 1.33 0.079 
ηc -0.216 1.127 0.303 0.210 
βc -0.693 0.211 -0.220 0.126 
 
Figures 4-7 provide the marginal distributions of the 10,000 
joint samples of η0, β0, ηc, and βc respectively. 
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Figure 4 – The marginal distribution of the 10,000 
MCMC samples of η0 obtained from the F/A-18 engine 
data indicates a relatively tight clustering about η0 = 6. 
 
Figure 5 – The marginal distribution of the 10,000 
MCMC samples of β0 obtained from the F/A-18 engine 
data suggests that the engines have very little risk of 
having an infant mortality failure mode before the first 
repair/refurbishment. 
Figures 4 and 5 show rather sharp marginal distributions 
based on the data for both base Weibull parameters η0 and 
β0. The base failure mode represented by the marginal 
distribution of β0 indicates that the failure mode before any 
repair/refurbishments is early wearout. 
Figure 6 – The marginal distribution of the 10,000 
MCMC samples of ηc obtained from the F/A-18 engine 
data indicates only a small risk of engine critical life 
reductions with repeated repair/refurbishment. 
For F/A-18 engine critical life to reduce with repeated 
repair/refurbishment, it is necessary for ηc < 0. Based on the 
marginal samples of ηc, as reflected in figure 6, obtained by 
using the procedure described in section 2 with the data in 
figure 3 and Table 4, there is less than a 5% risk that F/A-18 
engine critical life will reduce with repeated 
repair/refurbishment. 
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Figure 7 – The marginal distribution of the 10,000 
MCMC samples of βc obtained from the F/A-18 engine 
data indicates that there is a substantial risk of the 
engine failure mode trending towards infant mortality 
with repeated repair/refurbishment. 
For the F/A-18 engine failure mode to trend toward infant 
mortality with repeated repair/refurbishment, βc < 0. Based 
on the marginal samples of βc, as reflected in figure 6, 
obtained by using the procedure described in section 2 with 
the data in figure 3 and Table 4, there is better than 97% 
probability that F/A-18 engine failure mode trends toward 
infant mortality with repeated repair/refurbishment. For 
most repair or maintenance technicians, this result agrees 
with intuition that repeated repair/refurbishment cycles is 
more likely to lead to earlier failures. 
Results Derived from the MCMC Sampling 
The previous subsection of this report identified the insights 
regarding the effects of repeated repair/refurbishments on 
the reliability of the F/A-18 engines that may be developed 
directly from the MCMC samples of ηc, and βc. How η (Nr) 
and β (Nr) change as a function of Nr may provide 
additional insights. Samples of η (Nr) and β (Nr) may be 
developed by merely evaluating equations (3) at the MCMC 
samples of η0, β0, ηc, and βc. This provides the uncertainty 
distributions for critical life and failure mode as a function 
of Nr given the data. Figures 8 and 9 best display these 
distributions using modified barcharts for η (Nr) and β (Nr) 
respectively. The bars in figures 8 and 9 start on the left at 
the 5th quantile for the distribution, and end at the 95th 
quantile on the right. Based on the data, there is 90% 
certainty that the true value of the quantity in question lies 
somewhere on the bar. The gray vertical lines on the bars 
are the modes of the distributions, and the color density on 
the bar is directly proportional to the probability density. 
These modified barcharts provide insights into these 
distributions visually, and are particularly useful for 
comparisons, especially of risk assessments such as 
presented in this report. Note in figures 8 and 9 that abscissa 
is logarithmically scaled. 
Figure 8 – Based on the F/A-18 engine data, critical life 
becomes more uncertain with repeated 
repair/refurbishment, yet trends towards larger values 
as it becomes more uncertain. 
Figure 8 shows that the critical life uncertainty grows 
significantly (width of the bars grows) with repeated 
repair/refurbishment cycles. However, it is very interesting 
to note that most of this increase in uncertainty is gained to 
the right, towards higher values of critical life. Note that 
even for Nr = 4, the mode is still far to the left side of the 
distribution. The mode location however does move 
monotonically to the right as Nr increases, but nowhere near 
as fast as the 95th quantile. The lighter color densities to the 
right as Nr increases show that there is very little certainty 
based on the data that the true critical life reaches these 
larger values. However, for the bars in figure 8 with smaller 
values of Nr, these larger values of critical life have 
essentially no probability of being true. This is not an 
intuitive result in that most repair or maintenance 
technicians might expect earlier failures to be more likely 
with repeated repair/refurbishment cycles. Recall that the 
critical life is the life at which 63.2% of all failures will 
have occurred. 
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Figure 9 – Based on the F/A-18 engine data, the failure 
mode becomes more uncertain and trends towards 
infant mortality with repeated repair/refurbishment. 
In figure 9, the mode of β (Nr) based on the data remains 
close to the center of each bar. As for the distributions of 
η (Nr) in figure 8, uncertainty for β (Nr) grows as Nr 
increases, however for β (Nr) the modes shift more radically 
than they did for η (Nr). Between figures 8 and 9, it 
becomes easy to conclude with significant certainty based 
on the data that repair/refurbishment does not return the 
F/A-18 engines to a new condition. If the bars in each of 
figures 8 and 9 overlaid each other better, with mode values 
very close, then this conclusion might be suspect. 
The best way to display the reliability uncertainty models is 
to parameterize specific quantiles of reliabilities obtainable 
from equation (12) as a function of both TSR and Nr. Figure 
10 presents these parameterizations for the 5th and 95th 
quantiles for reliabilities for the F/A-18 engines based on 
the data as a function of Nr.  
Figure 10 – Based on the F/A-18 engine data, reliability 
uncertainties vary non-intuitively with repeated 
repair/refurbishment. 
Figure 10 uses dashed lines to indicate the 5th quantile 
parametric reliability, and solid lines to indicate the 95th 
quantile parametric reliability. Figure 10 also uses color to 
indicate the value of Nr for the parameterized quantiles: 
black for Nr = 0, blue for Nr = 1, green for Nr = 2, orange 
for Nr = 3, and red for Nr = 4. A vertical slice in figure 10 
reveals that there is a 90% probability based on the F/A-18 
engine data that the reliability is between 32% and 42% at 
TSR = 6 if there have been no repair/refurbishments (for 
Nr = 0, black dashed line up to black solid line).  
The reliability uncertainty quantiles in figure 10 indicate 
that reliability for different values Nr as a function of TSR 
does not behave linearly, or even intuitively. Figure 10 is 
very information and insight rich. The 95th quantile 
reliabilities increase as the number of repair/refurbishments 
increases, and even more so as TSR increases. Out beyond 
TSR = 5.8, the 5th quantile reliabilities also increase as the 
number of repair/refurbishments increases. At TSR = 10, 
based on the solid black line, the F/A-18 engine data reveals 
that there is a 95% probability that the true reliability given 
no repair/refurbishments (Nr = 0) is less than 20%. Strangely 
enough, the very same data reveals via the dashed red line at 
TSR = 10, that there is a 95% probability that the true 
reliability is better than 20% after four 
repair/refurbishments cycles (Nr = 4). This means that based 
on the F/A-18 engine data, repeated repair/refurbishment 
appears to actually improve reliability dramatically for very 
large values of TSR, with 95% certainty. This rather 
startling result must however be tempered by the fact that 
none of the F/A-18 engine data had failures or survivors 
beyond TSR = 7.3, and that the reliability levels at large 
values of TSR are probably considerably below required 
levels. However, this remains a good example of the non-
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intuitive insights obtainable by taking advantage of the 
covariate information associated with the F/A-18 engine 
data, only possible using the covariate Weibull model and 
the conditional inferential method presented in section 2. 
Hypothetical Preventative Maintenance Planning Using 
these Results 
How this information can be used in preventative 
maintenance planning is best described using a hypothetical 
example. The example that follows is not intended to be 
representative of actual F/A 18 characteristics and 
performance. This example demonstrates that the insights 
gained from use of the covariate Weibull model in 
conjunction with the conditional inferential method 
presented in section 2 may be used to improve on a fixed 
periodic schedule of engine removals.  
Suppose the F/A-18 had a required 70% mission assurance 
for a mission length of 0.5 in TSR units. For purposes of 
this hypothetical example, the engine is the only part that 
will ever fail; all other systems for this aircraft are presumed 
perfect. That 70% mission assurance requirement 
immediately translates to a minimum acceptable reliability 
for this engine of 70%. Suppose also that the maximum 
acceptable risk for the engine not achieving this reliability is 
only 5%. Suppose also that a periodic schedule of engine 
removals for FOD inspections, and if needed 
repair/refurbishments, is fixed at intervals of 1.2 in TSR 
units.  
The information in figure 10 can be used to plan a 
preventative maintenance schedule that takes advantage of 
the covariate information Nr that guarantees satisfaction of 
this mission assurance requirement at the maximum 
acceptable risk. Figure 11 is an expansion of figure 10 that 
will demonstrate more easily how this information may be 
used to accomplish this. 
Figure 11 – Preventative maintenance planning that 
takes advantage of the covariate number of 
repair/refurbishments may be performed using an 
expansion of figure 10 using only 5th quantiles. 
In figure 11, where the dashed lines cross the required 70% 
reliability level (brown horizontal line) provides some very 
useful information for this hypothetical example. Before 
and at these junctures, there is no more than a 5% risk that 
the reliability will be below 70% for the respective values of 
Nr. The black and blue dashed lines both (pure coincidence 
for this engine and hypothetical example) cross the required 
70% reliability line at TSR = 2.55 (blue vertical line). If the 
F/A-18 engine has repaired/refurbished no more than once, 
the reliability requirement is satisfied for a mission duration 
of 0.5 in TSR units at less than the maximum acceptable 
risk for engine life up to TSR = 2.55. It would be very 
reasonable to schedule preventative maintenance no later 
than TSR = 2.05 (TSR = 2.55 less the mission duration of 
0.5) for engines that have only been repaired/refurbished no 
more than once. This value is much larger than the fixed 
interval of 1.2 in TSR units, and cost savings and 
operational efficiencies may be possible using it instead.  
By examining the other respective colored dashed and 
vertical lines in like fashion, figure 11 reveals that 
preventative maintenance at TSR = 1.65 for Nr = 2 
(TSR = 2.15 less the mission duration of 0.5), at TSR = 1.1 
for Nr = 3 (TSR = 1.6 less the mission duration of 0.5), and 
at TSR = 0.33 for Nr = 4 (TSR = 0.83 less the mission 
duration of 0.5) all similarly satisfy the hypothetical F/A-18 
engine reliability requirement at less than the maximum 
acceptable risk. For repair/refurbishment cycle numbers of 
Nr < 3, these proposed inspection scheduled times are 
greater than the current fixed inspection interval of 1.2 in 
TSR units, and cost savings and operational efficiencies 
may be possible. After three or more repair/refurbishment 
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cycles, the required reliability at the maximum acceptable 
risk is not achievable with a fixed inspection schedule 
interval of 1.2 in TSR units.  
At some point, considering the costs of preventative 
maintenance versus the costs of a new engine and it makes 
sense that an engine could be retired from service; it is less 
expensive to replace the engine than to repair/refurbish it 
for very short mission times. In this example, after the 
fourth repair/refurbishment, the preventative maintenance 
interval that will meet the reliability requirement at the 
maximum acceptable risk is less than the hypothetical 
mission duration. After four repair/refurbishments, it is not 
possible to satisfy the mission assurance requirement for the 
specified mission duration of 0.5 in TSR units at the 
required maximum acceptable risk. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
There are several important conclusions from the work 
presented in this report.  
First, the covariate Weibull model used in conjunction with 
the conditional inferential method presented in section 2 can 
be used to effectively investigate whether repeated 
repair/refurbishments improve or degrade an aerospace 
system’s reliability, even when the data is dominated by 
survivors. Note that the conditional inferential method 
presented in section 2 avoided many questionable 
assumptions. 
Second, by using the covariate Weibull model and 
conditional inferential method presented in section 2 for the 
data presented in section 4, the authors discovered that there 
is less than a 5% risk that critical life decreases with 
repeated repair/refurbishment for the F/A-18 engines. This 
rather strong confirmation that critical life increases for the 
F/A-18 engines with repeated repair/refurbishment is non-
intuitive, and may offer opportunities to improve 
preventative and corrective maintenance planning.  
Third, by using the covariate Weibull model and conditional 
inferential method presented in section 2 for the data 
presented in section 4, there is a 97% probability that the 
failure mode moves towards infant mortality (decreasing β) 
with repeated repair/refurbishment. This result confirms 
normal intuition about repairs, that earlier failures should be 
expected after repair and return to service. The insight that 
reliability of the F/A-18 engines also improved as a function 
of repeated repair/refurbishments for large values of TSR 
was entirely non-intuitive. 
Fourth, based on the hypothetical example presented in 
section 5, improvements in availability and mission 
assurance for these F/A-18 engines may be achieved 
through modifications of preventative maintenance 
schedules for engine removals based on numbers of 
repair/refurbishments. This result is of significant 
operational importance as the periodic inspection used to 
detect FOD requires a high level of maintainer knowledge, 
skills, and time. Reducing the frequency of 
repair/refurbishments relieves this workload burden and 
potentially the number of personnel deployed in harm’s way 
at sea and in warzones.  
Fifth, based on the hypothetical example presented in 
section 5, improvements in preventative maintenance cost 
effectiveness may be possible using the MCMC samples 
presented in this report in conjunction with the methods 
developed by Powell [17] for finding optimal cost 
preventative maintenance intervals.  
Sixth, the statistical analysis and unanticipated results 
obtained by using the covariate Weibull model and 
conditional inferential method presented in this report 
justifies collection of additional maintenance data and 
further engineering analysis to gain a better understanding 
of the drivers of this pattern of reliability.  
Seventh, the covariate Weibull model and conditional 
inferential method presented, validated, and exercised in 
this report may be used to investigate potential 
improvements in availability, mission assurance, and cost 
effectiveness of preventative and corrective maintenance for 
any aerospace system that is repeatedly repaired/refurbished 
and returned to service. 
Further investigations of the method presented in this report 
using the covariate Weibull model and conditional 
inferential approach remain. The method should be 
investigated via sensitivity analyses regarding proportions 
of survivor to failure data to determine just how many 
failure data are actually needed to obtain useful results. Via 
simulated data, various values of η0, β0, ηc, and βc should 
be explored to bound the detectability of effects that could 
be used to improve preventative and corrective 
maintenance. These and similar results should be 
investigated as to other measures related to the coupling of 
reliability, availability, maintainability, and logistics to 
determine if other improvements are possible.  
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